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Jorge Melendez, known as Commander Jonas, chief of the FMLN southeastern revolutionary army,
was interviewed recently by PRENSA LATINA correspondent Arturo Lozza. The major topics of the
interview published on March 3 were Melendez's remarks on strategies by the FMLN and the FDR
(Democratic Revolutionary Front) to involve the majority of the Salvadoran people in the liberation
struggle and regarding the formation of a broad-based political party. Lozza: In 1979 and 1980 the
revolutionary struggle had reached a high point. In what ways is the current situation different from
the earlier high point? Melendez: Many things are different. The FMLN in 1979 and 1980 was not
the fighting force it is today. There were people who were organized and ready to carry out certain
violent actions against the government security forces. However, the FMLN was not then able to
launch its military offensive, which got underway only in 1981. The main reason for the FMLN
was unable prior to 1981 to launch the offensive was the lack of unity on the left, the absence of a
single coherent plan, and thus, its implementation by all means possible. The 1981 offensive did
not represent the final victory, but it marked the beginning of the formation of the revolutionary
army. During 1981, 1982 and 1983, the FMLN gained in experience and worked to broaden its
social base in rural areas. In 1983, we drove the regime to near collapse. However, victory was not
achieved because the masses of people were retreating because of the regime's genocidal policy of
extermination. Lozza: Wasn't US intervention in El Salvador increasing at the same time? Melendez:
US intervention grew, particularly from 1981 to the present, such as in military and logistic expertise,
counterinsurgency training. In 1983, Washington attempted to bring the Salvadoran regime out
of international isolation. The Jose Napoleon Duarte government, which emerged from the US
strategy, has kept the war going with US encouragement. This means large military expenditures at
a time when production and employment are declining. It is important to point out that as a result
of US intervention, the army was transformed from a tool of the local oligarchy to practically an
appendage of the US army. It is now an instrument dependent on the US, ranging from logistical
support to training. Neither the oligarchy nor the Salvadoran government any longer decides what
to do with the army, Washington does. But that army is faced with a serious contradiction. Although
it is an instrument of the United States, its troops are Salvadoran. The army is composed of men
who represent interests opposed in some ways to those Washington defends. Lozza: In 1984, Duarte
took power with...promises for democratization. What position did the FMLN take in the face of that
situation? Melendez: Militarily, we had reached the outskirts of the largest cities and the country's
strategic roads, but we realized we could not win because of the increased US military presence.
At that time we made mistakes. We adopted the policy of rapidly strengthening the revolutionary
army by calling for patriotic recruiting. It did not work. We saw that the people did not respond...We
then decided to bolster the political factor, and to organize the masses. Lozza: How successful
was that change in FMLN tactics? Melendez: The revolutionary army became the FMLN's largest
instrument of political organization. We agreed that guerrilla tactics were not strictly military,
but above all, political. Each guerrilla unit became not only a military force, but also a generator
of mass political force to start forming revolutionary structures in all regions of the country. That
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enabled us to carry out the tactic known as the war of all the people. We cannot fight imperialism
and the oligarchy with a revolutionary army alone; we must involve all the people, including mass
organizations, FMLN military forces, militias, peasants, alliances with middle class sectors, petty
bourgeoisie...This new strategy also enabled us to operate throughout the national territory and to
succeed in the accelerated development of our social base, to organize the masses and recover the
popular movement. Lozza: Does this mean that Duarte's attempt to win popular support for a new
political and military offensive against the FMLN has failed? Melendez: That's right. Duarte was
merely the cover for a US offensive.

-- End --
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